

CHAPTER THREE: NIGERIA IN WEST AFRICAN REGIONALISM.

3.0 Overview:

The role and impact of Nigeria in West African regionalism draw essentially from the centrality of and focus on her African regional policies. It is the manifestation of Nigeria's struggle to strengthen and build an African response capacity to intervene in African problems.¹¹⁵ Such regional capacity-building is imbued on the conviction and resolute efforts to enhance the peace and stability of the region as the benchmark for speeded progress, mutual cooperation and conciliation that will pave the environment for regional integration.

Regional Integration therefore presupposes the mutual collaboration, negotiation and cooperative relationship of national interests codified in the foreign policies of states. These foreign policies of states form major aspects of the regional policies which unchangeably promote regionalism.

On this standpoint, the issues and concept of foreign policy broadly defines and delimits the scope and objectives of regional cooperation. Foreign policy pivotally becomes an instrument of integration. The basis and crux of issues suffices as the economics of states insatiability. This explains the poser why states define their interest politics in relation to other states or precisely extend their influences or seek mutual cooperation with other regional or extra-regional affairs? At what points do states relate in concert and with what concerns? This explains Nigeria's political and economic concern for the region as expressed in the pillars of her regional policies. Jaja Wachuku articulates this understanding in the sixteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly,

¹¹⁵ D.S. Gordon, and F.H. Toase, ed., *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p.xxix.

Our foreign policy is based on three pillars; the concept that Nigeria is an African nation; it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country. ... We are independent in everything, but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa. The moment Africa is affected we are involved. We want to make this absolutely clear: Nigeria finds itself involved in anything affecting African continent Anywhere, any square inch of African t territory- we are involved. We cannot be neutral, so that neutralism , used in a broad sense, should exclude our country when it comes to African affairs. And being a member of African community and feeling ourselves completely bound to its destiny and accepting our involvement in everything that pertains it, obviously all questions pertaining to Africa must be considered as questions pertaining to Nigeria. The Peace of of Africa is the peace of Nigeria. Its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to its future. [The other two pillars are the Commonwealth and the United Nations.]¹¹⁶

Based on these pillars, the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy are formulated as follows:

- a) The strengthening of African solidarity. This is done both bilaterally and through continental and regional organizations and institutions like the OAU and ECOWAS;
- b) The promotion of peace and stability as well as security on the African continent. Nigeria has underlined this through its commitment to the principles of, and respect for the OAU charter, especially those relating to the inviolability of territorial integrity of all countries, peaceful accommodation, and settlement of all disputes without foreign interference;
- c) Active participation in, and support for, international organizations such as the United Nations;
- d) Support for the rights of peoples to self-determination and freedom from colonial and foreign subjugation, and for all liberation movements, in their legitimate struggle for national independence;

¹¹⁶See Text of the Speech by Dr Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria Honourable Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in the Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly- Sixteenth Session-Plenary Meetings, 1031st Meeting 10 October, 1961, p. 339. para. 6 and 7.

- e) An unwavering support for all effort to destroy obnoxious system of Apartheid in Southern Africa and all forms of racial bigotry and prejudice anywhere in the world.
- f) Furtherance of Nigeria's economic interests by, amongst other things, the active promotion of trade and investments both bilaterally and multilaterally. This policy is otherwise known as economic diplomacy;
- g) Strengthening of regional economic cooperation. This has taken the form of active support for the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] as well as Chad Basin Commission and the River Niger Authority;
- h) Promotion of regional solutions to regional conflicts, which has found expression in the often stated preference for finding African solutions to African problems;
- i) Promotion of Human Rights in all its ramifications. In this regard, Nigeria has consistently advocated respect for economic and social rights in addition to civil and political rights;
- j) Encouragement of political pluralism. This has taken the form of advocating the adoption of democratic systems of government in Africa especially given Nigeria's own desire to establish democratic rule.¹¹⁷

Regional policy could be understood from this pointview as the mutual intercourse of national interests; ipso facto, foreign policy and by implication regional policy is public policy sui generis, but it also incorporates the influences of the external order.

In the limelight of the supposition, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa calls an 'African Renaissance' which entails the organic and systemic civilization, restructuring, reordering re-evaluating and reformulating the premises and terms of African international relations. This a holistic framework that ushers in new thinking and new approaches to African regional concerns. Kofi Annan of Ghana and the Secretary-General of the United

¹¹⁷ Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity, p. 19.

Nations fervently enjoins that Africa must stop now and look at itself.¹¹⁸ This retrospective introspection is aimed at profound apprehension of the fragility of African politics. It is also directed at carrying out an in-depth but correct assessment of the status quo with a view to identifying specific problem-issues that undermine states stability and democratization processes. It is expected that such reviews will schematize functional and systematic resolutions on regional problems as an effort to buttress demonstrable political will of reputable political actions than precipitate and proliferate conflicts and violence at the interest of some political detractors. He pointedly argues that:

Where there is insufficient control of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of a peaceful means to change or replace leadership or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important and stakes become dangerously high.¹¹⁹

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in his address to the 1996 Summit Conference, designated the trend as the new era in the OAU and advised caution in case ambitious programmes may result in failure, which in turn would cause loss of interest and shake the confidence of member states in the Organization of African Unity.¹²⁰

Nigeria's dynamic efforts and insistence on regional institutional foundations and reforms vividly expressed in her regional policies is a clarion manifestation of her commitment to African regionalism variously perceived as renaissance. It would be a sad mistake as Hon. Anthony Ani puts it if Africa is left out in the current globalization of the economies of the world; it would be like a tripod with one leg broken.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹¹⁹ Bone, J., 'UN Chief Tells Africa to Reform', *The Times*, 12 April, 1998.

¹²⁰ K., Ingham, ed., *Foreign Relations of African States*, London: Butterworth & Co., Ltd, 1974, p. 333.

¹²¹ Anthony Ani, 'How to Say 'No' Nicely', *Leaders* October-December 1995, vol. 18, no.4, p. 273. The Honorable Chief Anthony Ani was the Minister of Finance, Federal Republic of Nigeria, during the General Sanni Abacha military regime.

Therefore, in evaluating the depth of Nigeria's feasible involvement and the advancement of primary institutional structures in the region, an eight-point schematic approach shall be adopted as follows:

01. Factors that Promote Regional Integration in West Africa
02. Factors that Militate towards effective Decolonization
03. Conditions for Effective Regionalism
04. Nigeria in The Community of West African States;
05. Nigeria Bilateral/Multilateral Relations with West African states
06. WAEMU in ECOWAS Integration.
07. Nigerian in Regional Security Questions
08. Benefits of Regional Integration.

3.1 Factors that Promote West African Regionalism:

Some factors have been identified as instrumental in the process of regional integration in West Africa. Such factors are relatively common in the most states of West Africa. They include the following:

01. Common Historical Trend: Commerce:

The four Commonwealth states of West Africa: Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra

Leone have comparative history of state origin through international trade and commerce.

All of them began as British settlements on the coast. The British trading settlements on the Gambia and in Ghana were founded in the seventeenth century. Freetown [Sierra Leone] was founded [sic] in 1787 on the land bought from the local chiefs, to serve as a home for slaves who had been set free on the high seas by the British navy. ...On the Gold Coast [now called Ghana] the British bought out the Danish and Dutch trading settlements in the nineteenth century... and in 1901 Ashanti and North were added. Nigeria grew from the British colony of Lagos and the British protectorate

over the Niger delta. Lagos was occupied in 1861, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was proclaimed in 1885; the colony and protectorate of Southern Nigeria came into being in 1906. Northern Nigeria was conquered and became a separate protectorate in 1903, and the two territories were joined under one Nigerian government in 1914. The small country of Gambia was often joined with Sierra Leone in 1743; joined with it again in 1885, and separated once more three years later; it has remained separated ever since. ...The trade in African produce was profitable; moreover, the expatriate officials were all British, and when a colony was rich enough to build railways and buy materials of any kind for official use, the rails, the engines that ran on them, the paper and typewriters in the secretariat, the picks, spades and shovels used by public works department were all made in Britain.¹²²

The advent of the Europeans [British] settlements and links in West Africa were essentially motivated by the desire to trade on African human and natural resources. This immediately propelled the construction and consolidation of strong commercial routes, economic politics that gradually transformed into civil politics and colonization of the region.

02. Common Administrative Structure:

Comparatively, all the four West African Commonwealth states had similar colonial and decolonial experiences of both *indirect rule* and *political structure*: the Governor, the Executive and the Legislature. The Executive council was to advise the Governor on policy measures while the Legislative council assisted in making laws. The Political structure was organized in such a way that Africans during this period were under the British colonial and imperial authority while the state authority was responsible to and/or under the British Crown in London. Many policy decisions and reforms were approved and effected accordingly. This somewhat political hierarchy was maintained in all the

¹²² Ward, pp. 147-148.

territories of these commonwealth states with negligible differences. They also had similar process of decolonization via the constitutional reforms and political changes.

03. Constitutional Reforms toward Decolonization:

One of the major instruments of decolonization and development of West African Commonwealth states [WACS] is Constitutionalism. The government of these states maintained flexible constitutions that enabled them to effect developmental projects in their respective states. The Political, economic and constitutional developments were inextricably linked. To instantiate this assertion, politically, the boundaries and territorial rights of Sierra Leone were fixed in 1895 while the Protectorate came under British control in 1898. In January 1, 1902, after the Yaa Asantewa the British extended control over Ashanti and Northern Nigeria as Protectorates. Economically, these countries were at this time extensively non-industrial with patches of interstate trade based on formal and informal agreements that were often the result of territorial conquests. These states were largely agrarian and uncomplicated. The simplicity and naivete of these states were explored and exploited by the imperial masters who quickly consolidated their stronghold to extensively search and exploit African resources- human, natural and otherwise. Geological surveys revealed the plethora of natural resources such that in 1926 and 1931 iron and diamonds were discovered in Sierra Leone respectively. It was not until the war of 1914-1919 that Gold Coast government made surplus revenue from cocoa exports, while abundant deposits of diamonds and bauxite were discovered after the war and manganese in 1915. In Nigeria, with the establishment of railways in 1914 by the colonial government, the exploration and exploitation of state resources became outstandingly

profitable. Trade in Tin, groundnuts, palm oil/kernel and other natural resources found their gains in international trade especially in many European countries.¹²³

With the rapid growth and consolidation of imperial and African economies and the extensive use of Africans in proxy warfare, the need for reform became exigent in the aftermath of the World War 1:

The first big constitutional step forward was taken in all three countries just after the 1914-19 war: 1922 in Nigeria, 1924 Sierra Leone, 1925 Gold Coast. The principles followed were the same in three countries. The legislative council was enlarged to include a good number of nominated unofficial members, and a few elected members; the elected members were all Africans, and so were some of the nominated members. In Sierra Leone there were three elected and three other Africans out of a council of twenty-one members: in the Gold Coast, three elected and six other Africans out of twenty-nine: in Nigeria, four elected and ten other Africans out of forty-seven. The proportions are strikingly similar: in each case the African members form slightly less than one-third of the total membership.¹²⁴

It is significant to observe that the post world war 1 era was a period of great economic strides. Imperial masters and state actors embarked on massive efforts aimed at exploring dynamic strategies to bolster their economies and balance the felt impact of the war. Extensive mineral exploration began with new exports and new technologies in skill development and acquisition. There was mass 'limited' formal education in the colonies until the advent of the European missionaries who augmented the process with western education and learning.

¹²³ W.E.F., Ward, Government in West Africa, pp. 158-159.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 159.

04. Independence:

The World Wars pogrom brought about the propensity or global quest for peace and mutual respect for territorial integrity of states. The United Nations adopted a resolution for the sovereign equality of nations to avert further subjugation and violation of the peoples and the states. International relations were now mutually based on foreign policies and on international standards. The rights of self-determination and self-government were obligated and conditions were enabled to enforce states mutual interdependence.

There was general constitutional advancement and reforms redefined in terms of the new global trend. Efforts and actions toward decolonization and self-rule were enhanced and expedited. Consequently, Ghana gained independence in March 1957, Nigeria in October 1960, Sierra Leone, 1961 and Gambia in February 1965.

Apart from the changing dimension of the international system, there are other dependent factors that necessitated the speedy transition to independence of the dependent territories.

05. Colonial Development and Welfare Act:

The British government in 1945 passed this act, which enabled it to embark on capital-intensive projects on education, social amenities and communications services. This act was aimed at the development of the dependent territories. As these projects developed, constitutional reforms were made to contain the new realities. These constitutional advances were rudimentary factors toward the independence of the dependent territories.

06. War Experiences:

Another significant factor is the fact of the *proxy wars*. Significant number of West Africans served overseas in wars and so became active participants/actors in international politics. At the end of the war, they were focused leaders determined in taking the African continent across the globe. Reputed nationalists like, Dr Nkrumah, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr Margai were deeply involved in the cause of Pan-Africanism and played active role toward their respective national independence.¹²⁵

07. Cultural Integration:

In diverse ways and at different historical trends, ethnic unification strengthened by cultural linkages and complementarities have encouraged mutual coexistence, communality [koinonia], and cooperation among multiethnic communities and states in the region. This was and is still celebrated and concelebrated as the communion of African brotherhood, sharing in love and understanding one another's problems. It was a supple strategy exploited by the fathers of Pan-Africanism in amassing the support of the various African communities.

The intrinsic unicity of West Africa depends largely on a profound appreciation and harnessing of the regional diversity as the measure and standard for corporate existence. Such was the instrument of integration in multiethnic, multiracial, and multivaried cultural states like in West Africa, the United States, Switzerland and the defunct Soviet Republic. Such harmonious cultural contact was overwhelmingly translingual,

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 160.

transnational and very consistent with the events of the times when the yoke of colonization was repudiated in the least.

The transcendence and stability of regionalism in West Africa could only be sustained and developed in an environment of mutual respect, cultural identities and collaboration. Thus, ethnic identification, cohesion and integration should be enhanced as common strand of regional cooperation. In West Africa, the plurality of cultural and ethnic communities should be integrated and developed as viable instruments of regional growth and unique attraction than loyalties of political divide.

08. Security Needs:

With the growth of regional cooperation and greater involvement of states in regional affairs, the need for security communities become axiomatic.

In West Africa, there is greater regional economic cooperation and understanding based on bilateral and multilateral alliances that strengthen African international relations.

States are fast becoming stakeholders in the ECOWAS space. It is hoped that such a development will generate greater political will and participation of states in the pursuit of regional equilibrium and balance of power. Through strategic and alliances and military cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral levels, states and regional conflicts and crises could be resolved or reduced minimally.

09. Education:

Through well-planned and focused civic education and political socialization programmes, desirable regional values and culture and indepth sense of regional identity could be inculcated into the regional citizenry at the different stages of their [personality]

development. Also emotional attachment, patriotism and regional history could be imparted accordingly either via experience, media manipulation or curricular programmes. When states develop positive regional consciousness, such is inadvertently transmitted down the mainstream of general interactivity. Consequently, the relationship between the states and the masses vivifies and exemplifies the relationship between the region and the states.

Other instruments of regional integration include, the mass media, historical legends, language policies, institutional and constitutional arrangements, establishment of regional fora, youth organizations and academic fora to study the problems in Africa and regional problems. Such studies could examine how the multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic loyalties could become effective instruments of regionalism.

3.2 Factors that Militate against Decolonization Process:

Certain political and strategic factors militated against speedy decolonization process, ipso facto against integration which was the major effect of West African Independence. These factor include:

01. Conciliar Membership:

The protracted adoption of ex-officio on permanent membership of the Executive and Legislature greatly retarded the democratic and governmental processes in these territories. They include European permanent officials who were neither elective nor partisan members. They were members of both councils because of the official positions they held and whose membership could not be threatened or terminated by any legislative act. But with the gradual constitutional reforms towards self-rule, and as African

membership of the councils broadened overtime, these positions were eventually either ceded to the Africans or were made elective.

02. Reserved Powers:

These were the prerogatives or exclusive powers of the governor to ensure that the government kept public faith [its promises including the promises of previous administrations], public order and good government. These authorities were sometimes interpreted and applied by the governor in accordance with and /or in defiance of the statutory laws [arbitrarily] in the pursuit of the 'state's interest'. As long as these powers existed [whether applied or not] they were aberrations of true democratization and impaired the actions towards decolonization. They existed in all the four West African Commonwealth States.¹²⁶

03. Special Duties:

Like the reserved powers of the governors, certain ministerial functions were directly controlled exclusively by the governor and were never relinquished to Africans. Such functions/ministries include external affairs, defence, and internal security. In all the four colonial territories, Britain controlled foreign affairs, defence and security through the designated governor of each state. Africans were never allowed to control these ministries until independence.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 179.

04. Cabinet Selection:

There was no full-fledged Executive Cabinet that was responsible to the legislature. What obtained was a cabinet varied intermittently with an ex-officio majority. But what African party leaders desired was a “cabinet in which all the members would be chosen by the prime minister and which would hold office only as long as it retained the support of an all-elected legislature; a cabinet which would be collectively responsible as long as the prime minister chose, but from which he could compel an individual Minister to resign if that seemed in his judgment the best course for the party and for the country. Such a cabinet seemed still far off in 1954.”¹²⁷

These were the major barriers to the political process of decolonization and promotion of self-government in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. They were eventually surmounted with gradual constitutional reforms, internal and external pressures for political emancipation of these states. This concludes the political history of the West African Commonwealth States. Other factors are already mentioned earlier in the chapter one literature review.

3.3 CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE REGIONALISM IN WEST AFRICA:

Apart from factors that determine regionalism in West Africa, some conditions have been identified as prerequisites for continued and effective regional integration process in West Africa. They are:

- a) West African Regional Organizations should be made and be perceived as effective instruments for regional integration of member States into the global

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

economy. Thus, they should not act as defence mechanisms for subnational loyalties or interests groups or puppets of external control; rather through dynamic and cooperative support of member states, pursue openness and stability with the rest of the world.

- b) State actors should muster and deepen strong political will to prioritize regional integration policies over and above sectoral considerations and, without losing sight of the primacy of good governance and national interest.
- c) There must be perceived resolute efforts to enhance and achieve greater institutional and economic policy convergence in the region.
- d) There should be formidable, viable, transparent and efficient regional organs and institutions capable of pursuing and realizing regional demands and of assisting member states in policy plan and implementation.¹²⁸

3.4 NIGERIA IN THE COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES:

The historical formation of a West African Community sufficed only as an ideogenetic attribution predicated of President William Tubman of Liberia in 1964. By 1965, a concerted attention was given to the idea in an agreement signed by Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea but was left per chance. Sir Abubakar Belewa of Nigeria reacted suggestively to the idea of African Common Market Economy brought forward during the African Summit Conference in Addis Ababa. His idea of sub-regional economic organ was rather compelling; He said:

Also a suggestion has been made for the establishment of an African

¹²⁸ Alassane D. Ouattara, "Regional Integration in Africa An Important Step Towards Global Integration" at the First Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance of French-Speaking Countries, Monaco, April 14, 1999; cf. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/041499.htm> .

Common Market. This is a very good idea; but I must say that we in Nigeria feel that it is a very complicated matter. We want an African Common Market. But can we do it by taking the continent as a whole? Or can we do it by certain groupings in Africa? What appears to us more practical is that we should have an African Common Market based on certain groupings. We are thinking, Sir, of a North African grouping which will include Sudan; a West African grouping which will extend to the River Congo; an East African grouping; which will include almost all Central African countries. If we base our examination on these groupings, I think we will arrive at a very successful establishment of an African Common Market, because I think it is good to trade amongst Africans.¹²⁹

In April, 1972, a political-structural impetus was given to it via systematic, practical and formal approach appended in a draft Treaty formulated in 1973 through the instrumentality of Generals Gowon of Nigeria and Eyadema of Togo. On 28th May, 1975, fifteen West African States had already signed the Treaty of Lagos that inaugurated this regional Organ as Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS]; while the protocols were signed in Lome- Togo on November 5, 1976. This became another successful formidable effort towards regional economic integration in Africa in the aftermath of the World War II. However, the oldest sub-regional economic grouping in Africa was the East African Community [EAC]. Nigeria being an active promoter of regional economic integration in Africa was greatly troubled with the collapse of this premier economic grouping; as rightly expressed by the Foreign Minister of Nigeria:

A major dispute which particularly troubled us was the gradual but inexorable breaking-up of the East African Community ... We were concerned with the implications for us in ECOWAS of the failure of the East African experiment which has been a relatively successful example of sub-regional economic cooperation.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ See Text of the Speech by Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Right Hon. Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria to the African Summit Conference, Addis Ababa, May 24, 1963, O.A.U. Document Summit CIAS/GEN/INF/35.

¹³⁰ See the account of the Nigerian Foreign Minister of the time in Joseph N. Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering*, Ibadan: Spectrum Publishers, 1987, pp. 111-121, for details of Nigeria's effort to avert the collapse of the EAC.

With the eventual collapse of the EAC, it called for a structural and policy reviews of ECOWAS, which is still being consolidated at the time. Thus, in 1993, a revised treaty of ECOWAS was signed. The set aims and objectives are as follows:

01. To promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activities which lead ultimately to the establishment of an economic and monetary union thereby integrating the national economies of West Africa.
02. To raise the standards of living of its peoples.
03. To maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent.

However the revised treaty of 1993 aims to,

04. extend economic and political cooperation among member states,
05. designate the achievement of a common market and a single currency as economic objectives.
06. Politically, it envisages the establishment of a West African Parliament, an economic and social council and an ECOWAS court of justice to replace the existing Tribunal and enforce Community decisions.
07. The treaty also formally assigns the Community with the responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts with the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] as the adopted regional intervention force.¹³¹

3.5 NIGERIA'S BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL RELATIONS WITH WEST AFRICAN STATES:

Foreign relations between and among different states and regional groupings in Africa underscore the latter's envisioned effort to rid herself of all metamorphosed vestiges of neo-colonization, underdevelopment and macroeconomic paralysis. It is a generated stride to participate actively in the ever-thriving and ever-evolving globalism. It foreshadows the fact, as previously stated that trade in Africa is still structured externally

¹³¹ <http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/ecowas.htm>

than internally. With the mass/capacity of inter-African economic relations still minuscule in relation to external economic arrangement with major economic powers, the need for inter-African macroeconomic Organizations with and of exclusive African interest becomes urgent. President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria underlined the urgent need for inter-African relations in this way:

ECOWAS remains the most important sub-regional experiment at economic integration in the African continent, a fact which bestows on us a heavy responsibility to see it survive and grow as a part of our contribution to the attainment of African economic community.¹³²

To ensure the objective of an African Economic Community [AEC], as planned and instituted in ECOWAS, Nigeria has since engaged and signed a lot of bilateral agreements at different levels, with the sixteen-member states. These bilateral relations stretch from a number of Nigeria Trust Fund assisted and financed projects for inter-state Road construction networks, Communication Development Assistance, Health and Education agreements, Infrastructure development, Training/Technical assistance, joint ventures and logistic programmes.¹³³ See appendix on Nigerian Trust Fund.

Nigeria's commitment to Africa's vision and interest was practically demonstrated in the establishment of a Nigerian Trust Fund [NTF] within the ADB. The Fund, which was founded in 1976 with an initial capital outlay of US\$80 million, was increased in 1981 to US\$88 million. Thus, from inception in 1976 to December 1990, the Nigerian Trust Fund has creditably financed 43 development projects in 27 African countries with a total range value of US\$240,764,220 [1US\$1.314 per 1 special unit of account]. These

¹³² Joy U. Ogbu, "Nigeria's Role in ECOWAS". Text of an Unpublished Lecture delivered at Command and staff College Jaji, by President Ibrahim Babangida on October 1, 1984.

¹³³ Details of Nigeria's financed ECOWAS projects, based on bilateral arrangement could be obtained from

projects range from rice irrigation, rural electrification, and water supply projects to construction of dams, ports roads airports and Telecommunications. Nigeria was one of the six countries that represented Africa at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation [CIEC] otherwise called the North-South Dialogue in Paris from 1957-1977. It also actively participated in the Cancun Summit on International Economic Cooperation, in Mexico in 1981 among distinguished Heads of State from industrialized and developing countries. To carry out its commitment to African economic emancipation and mutual strategic bilateral cooperation, Nigeria maintains the single largest shareholding in the African Development Bank [ADB] established in 1964 by OAU member states, with a share capital of nine percent.¹³⁴

Nigeria's sustained advocacy for economic and political reliance has variously propelled several bilateral and multilateral joint ventures and economic integration frameworks in and outside the sub-region. For instance, Nigeria and Niger established a joint Commission; also Nigeria has joint ventures with Guinea and Benin respectively for Uranium mining, cements production, sugar refining and divergent road construction networks. It entered into multinational arrangement with Rwanda and Burundi for Rugombo-Bugaurmu road network and Liptako-Gourma on Telecommunications. Other notable instances are the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which groups Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The aim of this commission is to jointly explore and develop the resources of Lake Chad; while multilateral arrangement with the Economic Community of West African States brings together the sixteen countries of West Africa into mutual economic cooperation.¹³⁵

the African Development Bank [ADB].

¹³⁴Nigeria and the OAU, p. 50.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 49.

Nigeria played a major role in encouraging trade and commerce within the sub-region especially with the establishment of ECOBANK Transnational Incorporate [ETI] with the headquarters in Lome and branches in Nigeria.

Nigeria's huge human resources has greatly contributed and improved the economic relations and standard of the sub-region and Africa entirely. With a population density of about 116 million, a good number of Nigerian citizens are involved in high capital-intensive merchandise across the states of West African and beyond. Nigeria borders about four Western states- Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and that explains the huge influx of legal and illegal immigrants from different countries residing in Nigeria both as refugees and transborder traders or otherwise.

On strategic capability, it is important to observe that the presence of Nigeria in ECOMOG has since bolstered the military posture and capability of the region. The 1988 Summit in Abuja, the FCT of Nigeria, resolutely adopted a Declaration on the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms for a renewable duration of three years. This is to equip the intervention and conciliatory operations of ECOMOG within and outside the region. The ECOWAS Summit of December 1999 agreed on a protocol for the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. This Mechanism includes a Council of Elders, Security and Mediation Council.

On the whole, ECOWAS has been designated as a pillar of the African Economic Community while other pillars include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA], Southern African Development Community [SADC], Economic Community of Central African States [CEEAC], and the Arab Maghreb Union

[AMU/UMA]. In all these pillar-communities, Nigeria has played major or relative roles politically, economically, strategically, and otherwise.¹³⁶ This solidly explains the active role of Nigeria in the integration process of both the sub-region and the entire African continent. With the millennial launch of the African Union which exemplifies and gives credence to the dynamism and spirited efforts of African Heads of states and government towards regional integration, Nigeria has since assumed a greater responsibility in the new dispensation. This is manifested in the restructuring of her political and strategic caucus and in the principled effort of the government toward lasting democratization process.

3.6 WAEMU IN ECOWAS INTEGRATION.

Integration process relatively and in most cases begins as economic integration through the committed efforts of state actors who, acting in concert and cooperation, develop an economic pool of resources, establish divergent economic facets, institutions and structures in order to advance and prosper member states interests or regional economies. The very start of regional appreciation stimulated through conscious and dynamic inter-state investments and development generates the impetus for economic resilience, reliance and integration as necessary motivators of regionalism.

West Africa like the Western Europe has maintained and developed formal economic machinery and ties that are preparatory to regional integration. To ensure the singular motive, the community of West African states is categorized into:

¹³⁶ www.dfa.gov.za/kfor-relations/multilateral/ecowas.htm

a) English-West African States: Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (which have been broadly examined) and,

b) French-West African States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The remaining state is Guinea Bissau which a Portuguese colony but sometime classified among the French-West African States. The English and French denotations explain the states colonial linings. The thesis shall briefly examine the economic linkages of the French-West African States {known as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)} as a complement of the English counterparts which have been examined politically and multilaterally under ECOWAS.

3.6.1 WAEMU: Institution:

In pursuit of the objectives of the ECOWAS Space, the French-West Africa established an Economic and Monetary Community in January 1994, to foster and deepen competitive and common market economy that is based on the free flow of Capital, Labour/Services, Goods and People.

Member states of the WAEMU are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The WAEMU States run a common monetary unit known as the Franc of the African Financial Community (CFA) which is issued by the regional Central Bank of West African States (BCCEAO) located in Dakar and Lome capitals.

3.6.2 Objectives of WAEMU:

Since the institution of WAEMU, the states have gone all-out to maintain and pursue the following policy objectives:

- To increase the economic and financial competitiveness of its member States in the context of an open, competitive market and a rationalized coherent, judicial environment.
- To ensure the convergence of macroeconomic performance and policy across member States, with the institution of a multilateral control procedure;
- To create a common market for the member States based on the free flow of people, goods, services and capital, the right of individuals to set up business within the area, a common external customs tariff and a common trade policy;
- To promote the coordination of national sectoral policy and implementation in the areas of agriculture, environment, transport, infrastructure, telecommunications, human resources, energy, industry, mining and crafts; and,
- Where necessary for the smooth operation of the common market, to harmonize legislation across member States, particularly the fiscal system.¹³⁷

3.6.3 Economic Reforms:

Based on the sterling objectives of WAEMU, the state actors embarked upon dynamic policy reforms based on the criteria for macroeconomic convergence, an efficient surveillance mechanism to enhance economic security of states. They adopted a customs union and common external tariff, harmonized indirect taxation regulation and initiated

¹³⁷ Fact Sheet, Bureau of African Affairs, "West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)" US Dept of State, Washington DC, November 18, 2002 @ <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/15202.htm>.

regional structural and sectoral policies.¹³⁸ Major economic reforms in terms of harmonization and normalization of both regional and sectoral relations include:

- 1) The harmonization of fiscal and border policies
- 2) The harmonization of Business rights and economic relations
- 3) The harmonization of Accounting Systems and procedures (SYSCOA).
- 4) The harmonization of Nomenclatures of Economic Activities
- 5) The Stake in force of Outside Common Tariff since January 1999
- 6) The backing of the structures for Collection and Treatment of Statistical Information;
- 7) The bets in open of Programme Statistical Common Minimum piloted by AFRISTAT;
- 8) The Rationalization of Public finances inter alia.¹³⁹

3.6.4 Single Currency for West African States:

With the gradual but steady development of the ECOWAS regional policies pursued through varied subregional outfits and commission on policy and implementation such as the West African Accounting System (SYSCOA), the Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets (CIMA), the Inter-African Conference on Social Security (CIPRES), the West African Central and regional Banks, the regional Banking Commissions, the regional Stock Exchange, and the Saving and Financial Markets Regional Council (SFMRC) and the AFRISTAT et cetera; the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI)

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Vigan Fortune Evariste, "International Comparisons, Case of West African Economic and Monetary Union" contributed paper at London International Conference on New Economy, April 2002; @ http://www.statistics.gov.uk/iaoslondon2002/contributed_papers/downloads/CP_VIGAN.doc

says the planned convergence of a single currency by member countries of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is well on course. Dr Ojo, the Director General of WAMI says: "Following the landmark decisions in Bamako, Mali, in December 2000, establishing the WAMI, notable developments in the WAMZ programme have taken place".¹⁴⁰ In a Press briefing on the monetary intervention at the institute in Accra, Dr. Ojo said among the frameworks already prepared by the WAMI are monetary policy framework for the West African Central Bank (WACB), external reserve management system of the WACB as well as a system of banking supervision in the WAMZ and operationalisation of the Stabilization Cooperation Fund (SCF) of the WAMZ. He stressed that: "The institute also designed an exchange rate mechanism for the WAMZ, which has been operationalized since April 2002."¹⁴¹ He however stressed on the primacy of stability which according to him shall never be compromised for any cause. To realize this objective, four primary and six secondary convergence criteria were prescribed for the eligibility for the monetary union. Among them was the reduction of inflation below 5% by member countries. To enable member states to meet these criteria the introduction of the common currency was extended to July, 2005 to enable them implement measures and reforms accordingly for this purpose. He concluded that the West African Central Bank [WACB] will begin operations on the 1st July, 2005 but shall not issue any ECO currency until it is firm with some technical problems.¹⁴²

In another development, according to West African Monetary Agency [WAMA] the official regulatory body for ECOWAS currency transaction, based in Freetown, about

¹⁴⁰ <http://allafrica.com/stories/200302080340.html>

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

seven million dollars' worth of traveller's cheques are to be issued in February 2003 at commercial banks in 16 west African countries. George Osaka the head of Research Dept of the Agency reiterated that: "It is a means towards greater economic integration and the establishment of a single currency unit in west Africa," ¹⁴³

The traveller's cheques, known as the West African Unit of Accounts (WAUA), are to be issued through central ECOWAS banks, at the exchange rate of 1.38 WAUA to the dollar. The cheques, will be issued in the 10, 20, 100 denominations with the ECOWAS logo on one side and flags of member states on the other.

Osaka observed that: "the biggest benefit is that much-needed foreign exchange will be conserved and businessmen will no longer need to use the dollar or (British pound) sterling in business transactions in the sub-region". ¹⁴⁴

The Economic Plan is expected to bolster the regional economic security, create the environment for capital influx and purposive investments, ensure macroeconomic stability, reduce domestic and external imbalances in order to appropriate savings and development, prioritize the development of basic infractural facilities in healthcare, agriculture, transport and communication, education, justice administration, power and energy as pivot of industrialization, enhance and broaden inter-African trade, and reduce poverty scale and eradicate corruption especially in public services.

¹⁴³ <http://www.banknotes.com/magazine.htm>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

3.7 NIGERIA IN REGIONAL SECURITY QUESTIONS:

3.7.1 Overview.

Geostrategic study of the African regional security posture has broadly shown a tri-dimensional pattern of the security issues of most states in the region.

On the one dimension, regional security questions draw their legitimacy from the increasing illegitimacy of regime politics, power politics, civil wars, national security militarism, political and ideological crises, coups and counter coups, and continued presence of the military in political arena/consequent problems of diarchy, et cetera. On another dimension, it involves questions of indirect control patterns, neocolonialism, external influences and determinants, rights of intervention, extraterritoriality, violations of sovereignty and sovereign rights, external power interventions and strategic political controls, conflicts of internal and external interests and other multiple threat effects. The last dimension, of regional security question is the threat of humanitarian interventions, economic politicizations and paralysis, poverty and starvation, diseases and natural disasters. These have at different dispensations resulted in the emergence of regional problems, dilemmas, security communities and alliances both on bilateral and multilateral levels and to which states have bandwagoned or balanced power.

Interventions arising from the regional partitions which were of colonial consequences have reduced considerably following the strategic intervention and conciliatory initiatives and action plans formulated and expedited by the regional intervention forces, and the resolutions of the Conference of African Heads of state and Government to minimize regional crises. Thus, regional insecurity and states vulnerability become the necessary current of these regional security transitions.

The problem is: should sovereignty be respected under all conditions or are there instances of legal breaches, in which interference in a state's domestic affairs becomes not only a right but also a duty? What responsibility does striking violations of international norms committed within a sovereign state pose to the international and regional communities? Does states insecurity necessarily imply regional insecurity? To what extent do domestic threats influence regional security? What are the level determinants of the African regional security questions? What constitutes a regional/international community and under what conditions and restraints could it intervene? How can justified intervention be distinguished from sheer and vested breach of sovereignty? Who takes the disadvantages of whom and at whose territorial rights or advantage?¹⁴⁵

Crises management strategies have not become easily effective despite amenable legislations enforced at different levels to ensure peace. At some instances, peace-support initiatives seemed to serve the interest of major powers than the real purpose. These flagrant abuses and apparently futile endeavours continue to question the integrity and continued use of some peace-making and peacekeeping outfits in some volatile areas of the region.

In this last segment of the discourse, the impact of Nigeria as a regional strategic power shall be evaluated in line with its measures and efforts in peacekeeping operations. Larger issues of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building measures shall be considered as effective crises management measures and conflict resolution strategies. Other areas shall include Nigeria's mediatory roles, conciliations, and humanitarian

¹⁴⁵ Michael Keren and Donald A. Sylvan ed., International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 2002, p. ix.

operations in the region. Also the import and presence of International community shall be briefly examined in order to assess how complementary strategies could help resolve conflict-ridden scenarios.

3.8 Nigeria's Conciliatory Roles in West Africa.

Nigeria's conciliatory and mediatory roles in the region could also be considered generally as consistent with the new dimension of strategic peacekeeping operations as inscribed in the UN resolution on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. This new dimension of peacekeeping seeks to maintain the existence and stability of the status quo by enforcing the OAU/AU resolutions on non-interference and inviolability of the African states/territories.¹⁴⁶ It pursues this policy via preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts both on bilateral and multilateral negotiations among member states.¹⁴⁷

Nigeria feels highly concerned about Africa and is on strategic alert to participate actively in resolving African regional conflicts via peace missions and strategic diplomacy. Robert L. Philips considers the imperatives of the new strategy, arguing that the trend is no longer that of if, but of how:

Today the dialogue is no longer at the level of legal principles but of pragmatism. It is not a question of whether the international community has the right to intervene or whether it should intervene: it is a question of how and in what way.¹⁴⁸

Nigeria in planning 'how and in what way' to intervene in intra-African conflicts adopted some strategies that are expeditious of the OAU/AU resolutions on peaceful resolution of

¹⁴⁶ AHG/RES 16 (1).

¹⁴⁷ OAU Charter, Art. 111(4); art XIV.

¹⁴⁸ Michael Keren, International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility, p. 58.

African conflicts. These include, a) Summit diplomacy, b) the deployment of peacekeeping/peace-support missions to disputed territories and, c) the use of Good Offices.

Nigeria intervened and resolved the conflict between Togo and Republic of Benin which was contentiously perceived as based on ideological differences between Presidents Kerekou of Benin and General Eyadema of Togo. Nigeria's effort was further stimulated and strengthened by the threat of a possible spill-over effect as Benin was Nigeria's immediate neighbour on the Southwest. Peaceful resolution of the conflict was obtained by Nigeria through the use of Good offices and the influence of its relative economic capability.¹⁴⁹

As a member of the OAU Good Offices Committee, Nigeria played an active and successful mediatory role in the peaceful settlement of Ethiopia/Somali disputes over the Ogaden region. Ethiopia claims of the territory was based on the principle of the inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries enshrined in the OAU Charter while Somali claims was based on the fact that the territory was occupied by the people of Somali stock. Peace was achieved through the clarification of the OAU Charter on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states by the first Summit of the OAU held in Cairo in 1964. The Assembly of Heads of states and Government resolved that all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.¹⁵⁰ Bolaji Akinyemi during the Nigeria's Presidency of ECOWAS restored effective communications and contact between Nigeria and the ECOWAS states

¹⁴⁹ House of Representative Debate, Lagos, August 20, 1960, Column 2670.

¹⁵⁰ AHG/Res 16 (1).

by lifting the boundary closures of 1984 and 1985; he diplomatically and effectively mediated the Burkina Faso-Mali frontier wars of 1986, restoring peace in the region.¹⁵¹ Nigeria in response to France, Sudan and under Chad's invitation, undertook a peace-support initiative in an effort to resolve the Chadian crises despite the protracted effort of the OAU Ad hoc Committee to resolve the crises. It sponsored a six-month conference on Chad between March and August, 1979. The conferences were organized in Lagos and Kano states of Nigeria. The culmination of this initiative was the formation of the Government of National Unity and Transition [GUNT]. The OAU also under the leadership of Nigeria sent a peacekeeping force composed of troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, to Chad. Nigeria sponsored the bulk of this peacekeeping operation to the sum of US\$ 80 million despite its failure due to some logistic problems.¹⁵² Furthermore, the increased reticence of the Western world to participate in African peacekeeping operation was based on African states resolution to find solutions to African problems; a decision based on the sore experiences of Western operations during joint intervention operations and more still, to avert the possibility of the neo-colonization yoke. Edmund Yorke in his article 'Regional Initiatives and Non-UN forms of Intervention in the Sub-Sahara Africa' stated:

Even at this minimal level Britain and France, like the USA, still suffer from accusations of neo-colonialism, ... France, in particular, attracted major international criticism for her military role in Rwanda in 1994 [Operation Turquoise] where she was widely seen to be acting more on behalf of her own self interest in trade and prestige terms rather than as a humanitarian protector. France [like Belgium] focused mainly on protecting expatriate and diplomatic facilities while French troops were even alleged to have turned a blind eyes to nearby massacres.¹⁵³

Mel McNulty, a fierce critic of French policies in Rwanda, observed that:

¹⁵¹ G.O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele (eds.), *The Structure and Process of Foreign Policy making*, p. 89.

¹⁵² *Nigeria and the OAU*, pp. 34-35.

¹⁵³ Gordon, *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, p.84.

Legacy of France's Rwandan intervention not only will be the abandonment of French ambitions across the African continent, but also the discrediting of foreign military intervention and the consolidation of a new assertive political climate within which regional solutions become not only desirable but the most practicable.¹⁵⁴

May and Clever observed the strategic operational withdrawal of the West as challenges to bolster African strategic initiatives. They insist that:

The precipitate withdrawal of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR [United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda], after securing the safety of Westerners, the apparent disinterest of the United States, the questionable role of France and the failure of the UN to reinforce its ongoing mission and alter its mandate to deal with genocide, all combine to support a growing belief within Africa that Africa's problems could only be effectively addressed by themselves.¹⁵⁵

Thus, the OAU has since inception assumed the primary responsibility often through ECOMOG *inter alia* for matters of security and conflict resolution.¹⁵⁶

3.9 Nigeria's Strategic Intervention in the sub-region: 1989-1999.

Nigeria has variously demonstrated active support initiatives in the multiple areas of logistics, finance, strategic operations, and even moral action with and to many states in the sub-region and Africa entirely. A strategic example is the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises.

The Liberian and the Sierra Leonean conflicts have strongly challenged and undermined the capability of the ECOWAS Intervention forces [ECOMOG]. It should quickly be noted that both countries have suffered from a distorted and decadent post-colonial infrastructure. Consequently, the current implosion of their social structures has

¹⁵⁴ M. McNulty, 'France's Rwanda Debacle', *Kings' Department of War Studies Journal*, 2,2, Spring 1997, p.20. See also M. McNulty, 'France Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: a Double Discrediting', *International Peacekeeping*, 4, 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 24-44.

¹⁵⁵ Gordon, *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, p. 85.

significantly unleashed untold regional and ethnic tensions particularly between the coast and the hinterland peoples.¹⁵⁷

The Liberian civil war triggered off in 1989 when Charles Taylor [a rebel ex-minister] launched a guerrilla attack from the Nimba province in Ivory Coast in an effort to oust President Samuel Doe from power. The war exacerbated with the further split of Taylor's group known as National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL] into another group known as Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia [INPFL] led by Mr. Prince Johnson. As the situation worsened with internecine destruction of lives and property, and total breakdown of law and order, the ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group [ECOMOG] initially composed of six countries: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea and Togo and whose primary role was to mediate and restore peace to Liberia was mandated otherwise to peace-enforcement in the crisis-ridden region. It is important to emphasize that Nigeria supplies about 80 percent of the ECOMOG 12,000 soldiers while other ECOWAS member-states complement the troop. Nigeria was as such considered the test case for regional strategic capability as a future peacekeeper for Africa.¹⁵⁸ Clayton describes the trend as "ECOMOG is significant as the World's first regional peacekeeping force not sponsored by the United Nations".¹⁵⁹

However, stating the reasons for the obvious participation and lead-role of Nigeria in ECOMOG, Ibrahim Babangida stressed that Nigeria firmly believes in the principle of

¹⁵⁶ See Salim Ahmed Aslim, 'Africa in Crisis: Response of the OAU and future challenges', *Ethioscope* June 1995, pp. 3-15.

¹⁵⁷ Gordon, *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, p. 88

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Clayton, *Frontiersmen, Warfare in Africa since 1950*, p. 194. For detailed assessment of ECOWAS/ECOMOG roles in Liberia, see W. Oduye-Kodjoe, 'Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 1,3, Autumn 1994, pp. 261-302; J. Adisa, 'Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 5,1, Spring 1994, pp. 83-110; *Nigeria and the OAU*, pp. 40-41; Gordon, *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, pp. 87-88.

inviolability of the sovereignty of African states. Consequently, Nigeria is determined to “restore peace by separating the warring factions in a sister country, Liberia, which has been temporarily destabilized and without any legitimately constituted authority.”¹⁶⁰ To ensure this commitment, Nigeria has expended huge financial resources to the sum of five billion Naira on Liberian intervention operations since 1990. This has impacted much on the economy.¹⁶¹

Sierra Leone on another platform, was a spill-over from the Liberian crisis which was resolutely planned by Charles Taylor in July 1991, to revenge against the government of Sierra Leone for aiding ECOMOG with bases and logistic support especially for allowing Nigerian Air Force to conduct bombing missions on his positions from Sierra Leone. On another scenario, the war was perceived as essentially a strategic tussle for securing authority and control of the local economic resources than of national political control. This is the motivation of even the young masses engaged in the war.¹⁶² For Nigeria and ECOMOG, it has been a mission of relative success based on the exhaustive capital and logistic support already spent by Nigeria on regional peacekeeping. However, Britain in January 1999 was constrained by ECOMOG financial problems and provided an extra sum of one million pound to improve communication networks, purchase of Lorries and for logistic backups in the Sierra Leonean operations.¹⁶³

Another crisis situation broke out when rebels held siege the cities of Bouake and Korbogo in Ivory Coast, killing hundreds of people and destroying thousands of property. Nigeria has since deployed troops and war planes in the area while other African states

¹⁶⁰ Federal Ministry of Information, Liberia: A Mission of Peace, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁶¹ J. Adisa, ‘Nigeria in ECOMOG’, p. 107.

¹⁶² Gordon, Aspects of Peacekeeping, pp. 88-89.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

assist to quell the spell. Nigeria junior Foreign Minister, Dubem Onyia stressed that Nigerian and Ghanaian forces were being sent because ECOWAS countries wanted to uphold democracy. He emphatically added that: "ECOWAS has decided that any government that has to be changed must be changed through the ballot box,"¹⁶⁴ Finally, it is important to state that Nigeria's regional strategic operations was always enhanced by her huge defence budget and defence expenses which runs from US\$ 2.2 billion in 1999 to US\$ 2.4 billion in 2000. Nigeria ipso facto stands as the highest military spender in West Africa. In fact, the government of Nigeria estimates that it has spent US\$13 billion on regional peacekeeping and conflict resolutions in the West Africa in the last twelve years.¹⁶⁵ See the Strategic Balance of selected States below.

3.10 West African States Strategic Balance: 2000-2002

GAMBIA	2000	2001	2002	Ghana	2000	2001	2002
GDP/US\$	400m	360m			4.7bn	5.3bn	
Per capita	300	260			242	270	
Growth %	5.6	5.8			3.7	4.0	
Inflation%	0.9	4.0			25.2	33.0	
Debt/US\$	511m	538m			6.7 bn	6.9 bn	
Defence Exp, US\$	3.1m	2.6m			40m	35m	
Def. Bdgt	3.1m	2.6m	2.4m		40m	35m	
Population			1,400,000				19,700,000
Nigeria	2000	2001	2002	Sierra	2000	2001	2002

¹⁶⁴ New Strait Times, September 28, 2002, p. 19. For textual survey of regional crises in Africa, see IISS Journal publication *The Military Balance, 2001/2002*, pp. 246-253; and also *The Strategic Survey 'Africa'*, pp. 317-353.

¹⁶⁵ IISS, *The Military Balance 2001/2002*, p. 250.

				Leone			
GDP	37bn	39bn			640m	760m	
Per capita	320	330			140	160	
Growth %	3.8	4.0			3.8	5.4	
Inflation %	6.9	18.9			-0.9	6.0	
Debt US\$	29bn	31bn			2.0 bn	1.8 bn	
Def.exp US\$	518m	526m			E9m	E12m	
Def. Budget	338m	517m	529		9m	12m	18m
Population			E116,900,000				E4,600,000

3.11 Nigeria Humanitarian Affairs.

Due to the increasing instability of the international systems which invariably influences and is influenced by the continued insecurity of the Regional groupings caused also by the regime politics of the domestic system, humanitarian actions became exigent in order to checkmate the rising tide of human insensitivities.

The UN through its specialized organs for humanitarian affairs, discharges laudable assistance programmes in volatile regions. Such programmes involves development programmes, resource and human rehabilitation in war-torn zones, poverty alleviation to check hunger and starvation, health assistance schemes for control epidemic and pandemic diseases and other assistance schemes with regard to natural disasters. These programmes are embarked upon with a view to restoring sanity to the troubled regions, improving the quality of life and intently affirming the inalienable dignity of persons. Nigeria, consequently participates actively in this global responsibility and more vibrantly in the African region. Humanitarian operations as such include, restoring peace to the conflict areas, helping to resolve intractable political crisis, ending guerrilla operations, civil wars or mutiny. It includes also the rehabilitation and resuscitation of

refugees, returnees, the incapacitated, the poverty-struck, voiceless, homeless, and displaced. James Miller reflecting on the intolerable plight of refugees and displaced person said:

No sound is more distressing than the plea of the homeless. Their cry expresses the pain of hunger, thirst and disease, and denotes the fear of death, insecurity and reflection of grim reality. It is an expression of a tragedy occurring daily throughout the world, but especially in Africa....¹⁶⁶

For many years, Nigeria has consistently acted out her commitment to the complicated problems of African refugees. In 1981 and 1984, the Nigerian government practically expressed her deep concern for African refugees through a subscription of US\$3 million given at the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa [ICARA 1]. At ICARA 11, the government also made as substantial non-cash pledge to promote joint project financing through the Nigeria's technical assistance programme with African states and National Liberation Movement in South Africa. It also made a pledge of US\$50 million credited to the African Fund. It gave the sum of US\$53,000 [Naira 500,000.00] for project assistance to refugees in Malawi through the Lagos representative of the UNHCR. As at 1991, Nigeria Refugees support amounted to US\$64 million.¹⁶⁷ On Administrative level, Nigerian Ambassadors who were chairmen of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees in 1984, 1988 and 1990 respectively recorded the following commendable feats:

¹⁶⁶J.C. Miller, 'The homeless of Africa' in *Africa Today*, vol. 29, no.2, 1982, p.5.

¹⁶⁷Nigeria and the OAU, pp. 77-78.

01. Establishment of Special Refugee Contingency Fund.

In 1984, during the Nigeria's headship of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees, the OAU Advisory Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, through the advice of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees made a viable recommendation to the OAU Council of Ministers [no. 68] to create a Special Refugee Contingency Fund to which, with effect from 1984/1985 financial year, one percent of the total of the OAU Administrative budget would be deposited in a special account for refugees. This fund was increased to two percent in 1989 through resolution CM/RES.1241[L] adopted by the Fiftieth Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers and the 25th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of states and Government. This is a credit to Nigeria's administrative concern for Refugees and displaced persons.

02. Establishment of Special Emergency Assistance Fund:

Regrettably, Africa has continually experienced the blight of natural disasters in some African sub-regions. Such disasters include drought, famine, and desertification/dessert encroachment. To this end, a Special Emergency Assistance Fund for drought and Famine in Africa was established by Resolution AHG/RES.133 [XX] of the twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government to cater for these emergency situations in Africa. Nigeria pledged US\$5 million to the Fund and have also served creditably on policy matters.

It is commendable to note that since the inception of this Fund in June 1986; more than forty-four projects worth US\$19,245,430.00 have been ably sponsored in twenty-one member states of the OAU. Countries that benefited from this fund are, Botswana,

Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and Angola.

03. Fact-finding Missions.

In 1987/88 Nigeria led the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees to about twenty-nine countries in the West and North Africa including Kenya for a on the spot fact finding mission on the situation of refugees and difficulties encountered by the host countries. The result of the mission provided relevant information for the preparation of the International Conference on the Plight of Refugees, Returnees, and Displaced persons in the Southern Africa in particular and Africa in general.

04. Promoting greater Awareness about, and International Support, for African Refugees.

Greater awareness and concerted efforts towards international support for African Refugees was achieved during Nigeria's Chairmanship of the Commission of Fifteen in 1989. The need was buttressed by Chief Segun Olusola, the Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia and the Chairman of the Commission. He stressed with deep concern the adverse effects the new trend at the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva could have on the deteriorating condition of African refugees and displaced persons. He noted that the cut down in UNHCR resource allocation to African Refugees was despicable despite the increase in the number of Refugees and also in the UNHCR global budget.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ See Text of the Statement of His Excellency, Chief Segun Olusola mni, Chairman of the OAU Commission of Fifteen on Refugees at the Extraordinary Session of he Commission held on Friday, November 10, 1989, p. 5.

05. Bilateral Assistance to Refugees.

Despite Nigeria's obligation as a UNHCR donor country, she has provided substantial financial assistance on bilateral arrangement to other African states with huge refugee crises. For instance, assistance was given to the Mozambican children, displaced persons resident in Malawi, US\$100,000 was pledged to UNHCR in aid of the African refugees; while Naira 3million was spent on relief materials given to thousands of Namibian refugees. These multilateral and bilateral efforts clearly expatiate the intent of Nigeria humanitarian intervention in Africa. Therefore Nigeria cooperates mutually with the UNHCR in assisting the Refugees, Returnees, displaced persons, incapacitated in the region.¹⁶⁹

3.12 **BENEFITS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:**

- 1) Regional integration fosters closer trading links between countries which would strengthen their capacity to participate meaningfully in world trade.
- 2) It would enable and assist member states to overcome the obstacles of small domestic markets, by helping producers to maximize economies of scale and greater benefits from the establishment and use of regional infrastructure.
- 3) A regional approach in major structural areas such as tariff reduction and harmonization, investment incentive, tax system harmonization and labour market reforms enables member nation to pool their resources and capabilities together and avail themselves of regional institutional and human resources in order to

¹⁶⁹ Nigeria and the OAU, pp. 75-79.

attain a higher level of technical and administrative competence that is untenable on sectoral basis.

- 4) It will also enable states to assert their interests from a stronger and more confident position in the international system.
- 5) The conditions and obligation associated with participation in an ambitious and purposeful regional programmes will facilitate the functions of domestic authorities in implementing politically onerous tasks for example, the reduction of tariffs or instituting broad-base reforms of the regulatory and judicial systems.
- 6) Regional surveillance, cooperation and dialogue among member nations will reduce to risk of macroeconomic spillage, resulting in a more regional economic security, stable and predictable environment which will encourage private sector investment and growth.
- 7) It will eventually lead to even development of the states of West Africa which will inevitably pave the environment for political and economic equilibrium, leading renewed sense of patriotism and regionalism
- 8) Because states are stakeholders in a regional economy, the tide of corruption will be low, encouraging poverty alleviation and resourcefulness among members.¹⁷⁰

The interconnectivity of African Affairs since the great Pan-African era has continued to reduce the African globe in her giant strides towards unity, a strategy that spells good for the continent. It becomes urgent to examine these linkages in order to preclude the error of discrete knowledge since all ECOWAS states are members of one African Union. Prime attention shall be given to the efforts of Nigeria towards African Unity which by

¹⁷⁰ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/041499.htm> .

extension incorporates basic sub-regional affairs of West Africa. The terminus a quo is the defunct Organization of African Unity [O.A.U.].